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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C

LARSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 920711-CA

vs.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation;
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS
COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appellant petitions this court

for a rehearing.

By his

signature below, counsel for appellant certifies that this petition
is made in good faith and not for delay.

A copy of this Court's

opinion is attached.
POINT I
THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE EVIDENCE
CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S VISITS TO DOCTORS.
This Court made the following assertions:

"Further, although

Larson occasionally sought medical attention for various systems,
he made little or no effort to learn the cause of his systems until
several weeks after viewing the unidentified television program in
1984."

(Slip Opinion at 3.)

"It is undisputed that Larson never

made an appointment with any doctor to discover the cause of his
symptoms."

(Slip Opinion at 3 n. 2.)

These statements are based

on an erroneous assumption that Mr. Larson had a neat package of
obviously related symptoms and that a reasonable person in his
place would have consulted a medical practitioner concerning those

symptoms. This assumption fails to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to Mr. Larson, as required where the issue is a
factual question for the jury and the issue is decided on summary
judgment. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991).
The statement that "Larson never made an appointment with any
doctor to discover the cause of his symptoms" is misleading.
Larsons undisputedly did make appointments, many of them, to obtain
treatment

for

the

personality changes.

most

damaging

symptoms,

(R. 564, 891.)

mood

swings

and

Any technical distinction

between making an appointment with a doctor to obtain treatment for
symptoms and making an appointment to discover the cause of
symptoms is only that—a technical distinction that should not have
any bearing where the case is decided on summary judgment.
It is also not material for purposes of summary judgment that
many of the appointments were made by Mrs. Larson.

First, one of

the effects of the chemical exposure was that Mr. Larson was not
fully aware of the changes in his personality.

(R. 881-83.)

Second, it is not unreasonable for a couple to divide tasks and for
the wife to make doctor's appointments for the husband.
Evidence that Mr. Larson consulted medical professionals
concerning his injuries is found in Mrs. Larson's testimony:
You know, we would go to counseling
because that seemed to be what was wrong with
him. It was these character changes and the
stress.
You know, going to these marriage
counselors, you know, they're saying, "Well,
there's stress. The headaches are caused by
whatever stress he's having," or those kinds
of things.
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But I went to counseling probably, I
don't know how often, but every time I
couldn't handle it anymore. And I also went
to my church people seeking help.
Q
So your perception of the problem
was that it's the sort of thing that could be
best addressed by counselors, psychologists,
people involved in marriage counseling; is
that correct?
A
Yes. Because we — that was the way
— you know, that is what was manifesting at
the time was his character — these incredible
things that he would do and that was what was
manifesting. So that is what kind of help we
sought.
Q.
No,
in
your
deposition,
you
testified that these problems were often more
apparent on the weekends than during the week,
would that still be your testimony?
A
Yes, that's
something to this?
Q

true.

May

I

say

Sure.

Q [sic]
At the time we didn't know what
was going on, you know, then and at that time
in our lives and being young, we kind of
internalized it thinking there was something
wrong at home. Later when we started getting
information about the chemical and knowing
what it does to a person's body, we did find
out that the reason that the weekends were
more volatile was that he was going through
withdrawals on the weekends when he was not
around the chemical. And that explained a lot
of that to us.
(R. 564-65.)
Larson also sought treatment for the headaches.

Larson and

those close to him, including his counselors, believed that the
headaches were related to the marital stress (R. 1467) , and the
headaches were more pronounced on weekends when Mr. Larson was away
from work.

(R. 1470.)

In addition to the treatment from the
3

marital counselors, however, Mr. Larson did consult with the family
doctor about the headaches and did receive medication for those
headaches.

(R. 566, 884-85.)

The medication did not help and some

of it caused more problems, so Mr. Larson did not seek further
treatment.

(Id.) Where this case was decided by summary judgment,

it is irrelevant that Mr. Larson consulted with the doctor while
there for one of his children, rather than making
appointment for himself.
received treatment.

a separate

The important fact is that he sought and

Mr. Larson testified:

Q
Mr. Larson, did you often accompany
your wife when she went to Dr. Young?
A
Probably half of the time, a third
of the time.
Q

So you were there a number of times?

A

Yes.

Q
Was it not unusual to talk to Dr.
Young about the problems you were having,
headaches, so forth, on those occasions?
We would always try and ask him something
about it because it was already — we were
already there. That's what we did.
(R. 585-86.)

A jury could conclude from this testimony that Mr.

Larson often consulted his doctor to determine the cause of his
problems, and that he exercised reasonable diligence to discover
the cause of his problems.
It is also important to note that Mr. Larson's failure to
follow through on what others would deem important was itself a
result of the chemical exposure.

(E.g., R. 861-63.)
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Over time, Mr. Larson's abusive behavior decreased.
Larsons

reasonably

believed

it

was

a

result

of

the

The

marital

counseling, not realizing that it was more likely the result of the
reduced exposure to trichlorethylene.
In

summary,

the

Larsons,

both

(R. 1473.)
of

them,

actively

sought

treatment for those symptoms which they believed were caused by
marital stress.

It was these problems which have caused the most

injury to the Larsons.

The Court's statement that Mr. Larson did

not attempt to obtain treatment for his symptoms nor determine
their cause overlooks or ignores this evidence.

Larsons now know

that all of these symptoms are related, but they did not know it at
the time Mr. Larson was being exposed to trichlorethylene.

Mr.

Larson's

the

failure to perceive the

interconnectedness

symptoms was reasonable, and a jury could so find.

among

This Court

should hold that there is an issue for the jury concerning whether
Larson took reasonable steps to obtain treatment for his symptoms,
and concerning whether he reasonably should have realized that all
of these symptoms, which

appeared

at different

times and had

different effects, were all caused by the same chemical exposure.
POINT II
THE HARDSHIP OF DEFENDING THIS CASE DOES NOT OUTWEIGH THE
PREJUDICE TO LARSON FROM BEING DENIED ANY CHANCE OF RECOVERY.
In footnote 3 of its opinion (Slip Opinion at 4 ) , this Court
holds that "this is not the exceptional case where the statute of
limitations

should

be

litigated."

The

Court

tolled

to

purports
5

allow
to

a

reach

stale
that

claim

to

be

conclusion

by

balancing

the

hardship

to

Larson

with

the

prejudice

to

the

defendants, and states "we would have to determine that Larson's
long delay in attempting to connect his symptoms with his exposure
to TCE has severely prejudiced the defendants . . . . M

Although

the question of whether the discovery rule applies is a legal
issue, Klinger v. Kiahtly, 791 P.2d

868, 870

(Utah 1990), the

Court's analysis in this case is based on a factual determination.
The Court starts the footnote by purporting to assume that "Larson
met the threshold discovery test," yet refers to "Larson's long
delay in attempting to connect his symptoms with his exposure to
TCE."

If the Court is in fact assuming that Larson took every

reasonable step to discovery the cause of his symptoms, the Court
is adopting a per se rule that individuals unwittingly injured by
a toxic substance may not recover after a certain number of years,
even

though

the

state

of medical

science was

such

that

they

reasonably could not have made the connection between the toxic
substance and the injuries.

Such a per se rule is not warranted.

This Court purports to assume, for purposes of footnote 3,
that Robert Larson did make reasonable efforts to discover the
cause of his injuries but was nonetheless unable to discover the
cause.

Based on that assumption, the balance of hardship against

prejudice weighs in favor of Larson.

The Court should determine

that Larson's long inability to connect his symptoms with his
exposure to TCE does not cause any prejudice to defendants greater
than Larson's own inherent difficulty in attempting to carry his

6

burden of proof after these many years.

See Klinger v. Kightlv,

791 P.2d 872-73.
CONCLUSION
The Court's opinion misapprehends the evidence in this case
and usurps the province of the jury.

The most serious symptom to

the Larsons was the injury to their marriage and family.

The

Larsons did actively seek treatment for that symptom. Most of the
other symptoms appeared related to this primary symptom.

This

Court should hold that a jury issue existed concerning whether Mr.
Larson made reasonable efforts to seek treatment for and determine
the cause of those symptoms.
The Court should further hold that the prejudice to the
defendants from having to defend with stale facts does not outweigh
the devastating prejudice to plaintiff from being denied recovery
for his very real injury.
DATED this

2L£tv

day of August, 1994.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for/J
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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JUL 1 5 1934
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Robert C. Larson,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 920711-CA

PPG Industries, Inc. a
Pennsylvania corporation;
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals
Company, a Delaware
corporation; Thatcher Chemical
Company, a Utah corporation;
and RETEP Corporation, a Utah
corporation,

F I L E D
( J u l y 15, 1994)

Defendants and Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable John A. Rokich
Attorneys:

D. David Lambert, Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, and
Stanley R. Smith, American Fork, for Appellant
Jay E. Jensen, Phillip S. Ferguson, and Karra J.
Porter, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Robert C. Larson appeals a
court ruled that the statute of
claims several years before his
discovery rule did not apply to

summary judgment. The trial
limitations had run on Larson's
complaint was filed and that the
toll the statute. We affirm.

FACTS
In May 1964 Larson began working for Black and Decker as a
tool repairman. His duties included disassembling tools,
cleaning the parts in a solvent, and reassembling the tools. The
solvent used was vaporized trichloroethylene (TCE). Larson used
the TCE in a vapor degreaser on an average of 15 to 12 times per
day over the next five years. Larson was promoted to manager in
1969 and after that, used TCE only occasionally until 1972, when
Black and Decker switched to a different type of solvent.

Within a few months after being employed by Blac. a.
Decker, Larson began experiencing physical and emoti^ al
symptoms, such as headacnes, bleeding from the sinus ;,
dizziness, mood changes, irritability, lack of sex c ive. imory
loss. Larson also became abusive toward his wife z 1 far. y.
Larson or Larsons wife occasionally asked the fam y pf ician
about various symptoms.
Larson contends that while watching an unide.'ified
television program in 1984, he was alerted to the potential
harmful effects of TCE. Four years later he filea this action.
The trial court granted the defendants/ motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Larson's claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Larson appeals.
ANALYSIS
Larson contends that the trial court improperly determined
that the discovery rule did not apply and thus did not toll the
statute of limitations on his negligence and product liability
claims. The applicable statute of limitations provides that
Larson's causes of action must be brought within four years of
when the action accrues. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3); Olsen
v. Hoolev, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993).1 A cause of action
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action. Olsen, 865 P.2d at 1347; Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). In negligence and product
liability cases, the last event necessary to complete the cause
of action is injury or harm. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 189
(Utah 1987); Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985);
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah
1979). It is undisputed that by 1974 Larson was aware of all of
the symptoms of which he now complains. Larson filed this action
in 1988. Thus, the four-year statute of limitations had run when
he filed his complaint.
However, Larson argues that the discovery rule should toll
the statute of limitations until 1984, the time he allegedly
discovered that TCE caused his injury. Whether the discovery
rule applies to a cause of action is a question of law, which we

1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3, enacted in 1989, states that tne
product liability cases must be "brought within two years from
the time the individual who would be the claimant in such action
discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered, both the harm and its cause.11 Because Larson's
action was filed in 1988, the four-year statute of limitations
applies. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25-(3) (1988).
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review for correctness. Klinaer v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870
(Utah 1990). "Under the discovery rule, a statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the
facts that give rise to the cause of action." Olsen, 865 P.2d at
1348. Thus, Larson must make a threshold showing that he did not
know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of his
cause of action. See O'Neal v. Div. of Family Services, 821 P.2d
1139, 1144 (Utah 1991). The mere ignorance of a cause of action
does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations.
Briaham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr., 744 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah
1987) .
Once that threshold test is met, the discovery rule may
apply in one of the following circumstances: (1) when the
Legislature has adopted the rule by statute; (2) when a defendant
conceals the existence of facts giving rise to knowledge of a
course of action; or (3) when application of the statute of
limitations would be irrational or unjust where, because of
exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff has no knowledge of the
cause of action until after it is barred by the limitations
period. Olsen, 865 P.2d at 1348; Klinaer, 791 P.2d at 872;
Mvers. 635 P.2d at 86; Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan. 236 Utah
Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (Utah App. 1994). Larson alleges the
circumstances of his case are exceptional, thus requiring
application of the discovery rule.
We believe that Larson did not meet the threshold
requirement of showing that he could not have reasonably known of
his cause of action. As stated above, there is no question that
by 1974, Larson was aware of all of the symptoms of which he now
complains. In fact, the trial court found that he knew of most
of the symptoms within the first months after his exposure to TCE
in 1964 and 1965. Further, although Larson occasionally sought
medical attention for various symptoms, he made little or no
effort to learn the cause of his symptoms until several weeks
after viewing the unidentified television program in 1984.2
2. Larson alleges that a genuine issue of fact existed as to
when he discovered all the facts relating to his injury.
However, it is undisputed that Larson was aware of all of his
symptoms by 1974. Larson also asserts that a material fact
exists as to whether he made a reasonably diligent effort to
determine the cause of the symptoms. We disagree. It is
undisputed that Larson never made an appointment with any doctor
to discover the cause of his symptoms. He merely asserts that
when he or his wife took one of his children for visits to their
doctor that he would occasionally question the doctor about
(continued...)

3

Nothing prevented Larson from seeking to discover the •.. -use of
the symptoms except perhaps his apparent reluctance tc /isi~
doctors and hospitals. Based upon these facts, Larsor ^an.;ot
assert that he could not reasonably have known of the xistance
of a cause of action. Larson's knowledge of the fact, of his
injury and his failure to attempt to discover the cau.se preclude
his reliance on the discovery rule. Because the four-year
statute of limitations had run and because the discovery rule
does not apply, Larson's claim was properly dismissed by the
trial court.3 Because we have determined that Larson's claims

2. (...continued)
treatment for a symptom. Based upon undisputed evidence, the
trial court properly concluded that he was not reasonably
diligent in discovering the cause of his symptoms. See Klincrer,
791 P.2d at 870.
3. Even if we determined that Larson met the threshold discovery
test, we would conclude that this is not the exceptional case
where the statute of limitations should be tolled to allow a
stale claim to be litigated. See S e w v. Security Title Co., 857
P.2d 958, 963 (Utah App. 1993), In balancing the hardship the
statute of limitation would impose on Larson against any
prejudice to the defendants resulting from difficulties of proof
caused by the passage of time, we would have to determine that
Larson's long delay in attempting to connect his symptoms with
his exposure to TCE has severely prejudiced the defendants by
making nearly impossible for the parties to discover credible
evidence concerning who supplied the TCE to Black and Decker,
whether all applicable instructions and warnings were transritted
by the distributors to the employer, whether Larson was exposed
to other chemicals that could account for his symptoms, and
whether the symptoms were actually caused by exposure to TCI.
See Mvers, 635 P.2d at 87 (stating that once the threshold zist
is met, in determining whether to apply the discovery rule, a
court must balance the hardship the statute of limitations would
impose on the plaintiff against any prejudice to the defendant
resulting from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of
time).
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were barred by the statute of limitations, we need not address
other claims raised by Larson and the appellees•

NormaivH. J a c k s o n ,

Jjrage

WE CONCUR:

R u s s e l l W. Bench, Judge

Si<-£ 7T
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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